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Abstract
The paper reviews an implementation of an additional en-
crypted tunnel within TLS to further secure and authenticate
the traffic of personal information between ProtonMail’s fron-
tends and the backend, implementing its key exchange, sym-
metric packet encryption, and validation. Technologies such
as Secure Remote Password (SRP) and the Elliptic Curves
Diffie Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) exchange are used for
the key exchange, verifying the public parameters through
PGP signatures. The data is then transferred encrypted with
AES-128-GCM.
This project is meant to integrate TLS security for high se-
curity data transfer, offering a flexible model that is easy to
implement in the frontends by reusing part of the standard
already existing in the PGP libraries.
1 Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the protocol that secures
most of our web traffic every day, while connecting to most
of the websites we visit. It is often represented as a green
lock next to the address of the webpage, this means the con-
nection is encrypted and the content is loaded securely. The
security of the connection is provided by a cipher suite, made
up of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to exchange a key,
and a symmetric one to transfer encrypted packets with the
mediated key. The authenticity of the connection is guaran-
teed by a certificate, released by an authority that certifies
the ownership of the domain.
This does not fully protect the user from an attack, several
cases of TLS compromise are known [8], both malicious [7, 9,
10, 11] and consensual [6], predating on the naivety of a user
or in corporate-issued devices. The most common situation is
the inclusion of an additional (malicious) authority that is now
allowed to issue rogue certificates and mark every connection
as protected, defeating the purpose of TLS.
A high-security service, such as ProtonMail, is interested in
adding a further layer of protection to the connection negoti-
ating an encrypted tunnel within TLS, with its own certifica-
tion system, key exchange, and symmetric encryption. The
implementation of this tunnel is fully in the application layer,
thus not dependent on the browser or the underlying operat-
ing system.
All the frontends connecting to ProtonMail’s backend API will
have to negotiate a session key as the first interaction, to be
then used to encrypt every packet. While generally using tun-
nels within tunnels is frowned upon, because of the perfor-
mance drawbacks compared to the slight security increase,
this might be a useful niche application: the larger issue here
is not the encryption scheme, but rather the certification sys-
tem.
The key exchange leverages elliptic curves, further secured
with a byproduct of the password exchange when logging in.
To ensure the authenticity of this procedure, the public pa-
rameters of the exchange are signed with a PGP-key stored
in ProtonMail’s key verification system, based on the Merkle
tree technology. This project, matched with proper source
code transparency and verification, can easily prove the au-
thenticity of the connection without compromises or interme-
diaries.
2 Design
2.1 Threat Model
TLS compromise is the main threat we are going to address
with this countermeasure, it might seem an unlikely scenario
but as we are going to se in the next paragraphs there is
plenty of real life cases where this happened. This is mostly
done on puropse, by large and medium corporate environ-
ments to surveil their users’ traffic, with little care about cer-
tificate validation and best security practices, like not using
always the strongest ciphers available.
In other, worse cases, it is compromised maliciously, by at-
tackers and goverment entities with various techniques, most
commonly by abusing the trust chain or exploiting implemen-
tation bugs, rather than cracking cryptography.
In this section these compromises are going to be analyzed,
to examine security of TLS implementation until the latest 1.3
version.
2.1.1 TLS proxy
TLS proxies are used in many business to spy on the user’s
internet traffic to avoid data leak or to filter content, or in mali-
cious settings they are also known as KCI (Key Compromise
Impersonation) [8]. This malicious attack is mostly performed
through social engineering and convincing an unknowledge-
able user to install certificates.
The compromise consists in a MITM (Man In The Middle) at-
tack: a root certificate is installed on the client, and when a
connection to the server is done, a proxy, or TIA (TLS Inter-
cept Application), intercepts it to act as a middleman, negoti-
ating a session key both, with the client and the server, thus
being able to snoop in the communication. The client displays
no warning while this is happening because the chain of trust
is guaranteed by the extra root certificate, hence not recog-
nising the proxy’s fake certificate as untrustworthy.
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Up to TLS 1.2 [3] the TIA behaviour is the following:
• the TIA forwards the client’s ClientHello message as is
to the server and inspects the resulting ServerHello and
X.509 certificates;
• based on the name in the certificate, the TIA may:
– “drop out” of the connection, i.e. allow the client and
server to communicate directly;
– interpose itself, answering the client with an alter-
native ServerHello and the server with an alter-
native ClientKeyExchange, negotiating different en-
crypted sessions with each party and forwarding so
that it can see the plaintext of the connection, as
shown in figure 1.
The attack can be performed also asynchronously, generating
the server certificate based upon the ClientHello, see figure
2.
C TIA S
CH
SH, SC, SKE, SHD
CKE, CCS, [FIN]
CCS, [FIN]
[HTTP]
CH
SH, SC, SKE, SHD
CKE, CCS, [FIN]
CCS, [FIN]
[HTTP]
Figure 1: Inline TLS 1.2 proxy. Square brackets indicate en-
crypted packets. TIA: TLS Intercept Application, CH: Clien-
tHello, SH: ServerHello, SC: Server X.509 certificate, SKE:
Server Key Ephemeral, SHD: ServerHelloDone, CKE: Client
Key Ephemeral, CCS: ChangeCipherSpec, FIN: only en-
crypted messages following.
It is a common misconception that TLS 1.3 [5] is immune to
this attack, but in reality it will make it just harder and more
computationally expensive. The main difference between 1.2
and 1.3 is the deprecation of the use of RSA key exchange in
favor of (EC)DHE, which implies that, for practical purposes,
a TIA must be inline to participate in the TLS handshake, see
figure 3.
This makes the “drop out” of the encrypted session impossi-
ble, i.e. a TIA is unable to selectively choose which connec-
tions to monitor: once you proxy a connection, you have to
proxy it until it’s done. Furthermore, the version 1.3 prevents
downgrade attacks, disallowing a TIA that only supports TLS
1.2 to negotiate a TLS 1.3 connection, without triggering an
illegal parameter error.
This is fully analyzed by Symantec [6] presenting a theoretical
implementation model for TLS 1.3 traffic interception.
2.1.2 Abusing the CA infrastructure
The Certificate Authority infrastructure is built on trust, strong
in theory, but in many cases CAs have been caught cheating
in the wild [7]:
C TIA S
CH
SH, SC, SKE, SHD
CKE, CCS, [FIN]
CCS, [FIN]
[HTTP] CH
SH, SC, SKE, SHD
CKE, CCS, [FIN]
CCS, [FIN]
[HTTP]
Figure 2: Asynchronous TLS 1.2 proxy. Square brackets indi-
cate encrypted packets. TIA: TLS Intercept Application, CH:
ClientHello, SH: ServerHello, SC: Server X.509 certificate,
SKE: Server Key Ephemeral, SHD: ServerHelloDone, CKE:
Client Key Ephemeral, CCS: ChangeCipherSpec, FIN: only
encrypted messages following.
C TIA S
CH
SH, [EE, SC, CVer, FIN]
[FIN]
[HTTP]
CH
SH, [EE, SC, CVer, FIN]
[FIN]
[HTTP]
Figure 3: Inline TLS 1.3 proxy. Square brackets indicate en-
crypted packets. TIA: TLS Intercept Application, CH: Clien-
tHello, SH: ServerHello, EE: Encrypted Extension, SC: Server
X.509 certificate, CVer: Certificate Verify, FIN: only encrypted
messages following.
“We are now witnessing occasions in which dig-
ital certificates are being spoofed or hijacked and
then sold on the black market. Attackers have
been successful in misleading trusted CAs, includ-
ing Verisign, Comodo, and DigiNotar, into issu-
ing fraudulent certificates for websites, such as Mi-
crosoft and Google. In September 2011, stories sur-
faced involving DigiNotar, a Dutch “default-trusted”
root CA. Apparently, the CA may have been com-
promised maybe as early as 2009; 531 false certifi-
cates had been issued including certificates for do-
mains such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter,
Mozilla, Mossad, MI6, and the CIA.”
These attacks raised concerns and new measures appeared,
Google has been pushing for CT, Certificate Transparency,
introducing transparency logs, in which all the issued certifi-
cates appear, to ensure that no rogue certificate is emitted.
This is mostly a retrospective safety measure, losing the CA
authority status is a good obstacle to anyone trying to abuse
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the system, but does not guarantee safety a priori.
2.1.3 Hash collision
A practical exploit for MD5 [9] has already been executed in
2005, raising many concerns. By now both MD5 and SHA-1
algorithms have been deprecated, many browsers and appli-
cations will display warnings or refuse connection when pre-
sented with these hashes.
The practical solution found by the researchers was to alter
specific bits of the hard to factor moduli to present identi-
cally signed certificates and forge a certificate that shared the
same signature, hence being verified by a CA, but holding
different private keys, allowing an eavesdropper to intercept
traffic.
2.1.4 Weak cipher suites
Many TLS cipher suites have been compromised [10]:
BEAST (on CBC encryption in TLS 1.0), Lucky13 (on CBC
padding in TLS 1.2), POODLE (on CBC padding in SSL
3.0), RC4 NOMORE (on keystream biases in RC4), FREAK
(on export-grade RSAkeys), Logjam (on export-grade Diffie-
Hellman groups), and DROWN (on RSA-PKCS#1v1.5 en-
cryption in SSL 2.0).
Leaving these chiper enabled in a webserver or client is bad
practice, but widely done not to drop connection for older
clients. Many of this scenarios are vulnerable to downgrade
attacks by exploiting protocol flaws (e.g. Logjam, SLOTH),
and flawed cipher suites should be disabled entirely.
In 2016 researchers were able to exploit 64-bit block cipher
[10] intercepting few hundred gigabytes of data and using a
birthday paradox attack on it.
2.1.5 Compression attacks
Starting with CRIME, Compression Ratio Info-leak Made
Easy, in 2012 a series of attack against TLS compression
have been done. An attacker that will be able to induce a
client to perform some specifically crafted requests will be
able to use the size of the response as indicator of the con-
tent of the request. This is especially true with CSRF tokens
as demonstrated by BREACH attack [11] that will reveal se-
crets repeated in the body in less than a minute.
This types of attacks do not rely on crypto itself, as they
can be used against stream ciphers as well as block ciphers,
rather on implementation itself, thus being much more insidi-
ous.
2.2 Structure
The tunnel is designed to protect the data since the first API
call because username, registration, and password recovery
are critically sensitive information that if the protection started
with SRP would not be encrypted. Therefore, an ECDHE ex-
change is performed on landing to mediate an encryption key.
In detail this exchange goes as follows:
1. the client requests the server key Q with a GET request at
/tunnel/key;
2. the server replies with a signed Q point on the
curve25519 and the server’s signing PGP key;
3. the client verifies the PGP key against a Merkle tree for
key transparency;
4. the client generates the public parameter V and the se-
cret Z, submitting V at POST /tunnel/key;
5. the server calculates the secret Z, and returns a newly
generated session UID;
6. client and server hash Z with the PGP key fingerprint to
obtain a session key.
From now on, all the traffic is going to have only the headers
necessary for transmission and the UID in clear to allow the
decryption. The private signing PGP key is meant to be kept
airgapped, so that a rogue server will not allow an attacker
to know the private signing key, that can be used to re-sign a
new Q. This procedure has the drawback that it requires an
administrator to rotate them manually.
When the log-in happens SRP generates a secret K that can
be used for the tunnel:
1. the client sends the server the username with a POST re-
quest at /auth/info;
2. the server replies with an ephemeral challenge S, a mod-
ulus M , and a salt;
3. the client computes the ephemeral parameter C, the se-
cret K, and PC = Hash(C, S,K) as authentication proof,
then sends C and PC at POST /auth;
4. the server then calculates K using C, verifies PC , gen-
erates PS to prove its identity to the client, and sends PS
back;
5. the secret K is finally hashed by both parties and used
as session key;
As it can be observed the secret K is generated with a per-
sonalised challenge for every user, using their own password,
hence making it very difficult to crack this key on an extended
scale. For every user and connection the discrete logarithm
problem must be solved, without giving a single failure point
as the factorization of a public key.
It is worth underlining that an attacker could save the traffic
for a long time to crack until it is able to find the password
to crack it all at once, but the secret K cannot be derived just
knowing the password, hence preventing this scenario. In that
case a new session can be created, but no information can be
derived onto a past or existing one.
The cipher suite Curve25519 with AES-128 was selected be-
cause of its robustness and convenience: the algorithms are
already present into the OpenPGP standard [2], making im-
plementation on clients easier, no additional library is neces-
sary.
To make the tunnel more robust and to avoid birthday attacks
the keys are refreshed after a set amount of time, enforced
by the server with an error. The client is then allowed to use
the old key just to refresh the session. Since this exchange is
encrypted the only information leaked is the timing and size
of the packets, making it very difficult for an attacker to guess
when is this happening.
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Figure 4: MD5 colliding certificates’ public key moduli [9]
Figure 5 visualises this mechanism, in particular the user ac-
tions and the corresponding key exhanges. It is important
to understand that since exchanges are performed within a
tunnel, to fully compromise the transferred information both
exchanges must be broken, as even cracking the shared
ECDHE Q public parameter will not provide information after
the SRP exchange, keeping the users’ keys safe.
Once exchanges are performed, AES-128-GCM is used as
symmetric encryption, as it is authenticated and fast, taking
advantage of hardware acceleration on the server and we-
bcrypto on the compatible clients.
In figure 6 is represented the packet encryption and decryp-
tion mechanism: a plain RFC 791 packet is encrypted before
leaving the client. The necessary headers are kept unen-
crypted, and the rest is encrypted with the same structure
provided by the standard: CRLF to separate each header and
two times CRLF to separate the headers from the body. In
this way all types of packet can be easily transmitted, whether
they are plaintext, JSON, or binary data.
To prevent replay attacks the packet is equipped with a nonce
and a timestamp, a packet is allowed 120s to get to the server,
after which is no longer considered valid. In this timeframe the
packets must always have a unique nonce, so that an attacker
sending twice the same packet will have the second bounced
before it is processed.
In table 1 the precise structure of a packet is outlined. The
encrypted part consists of the first 16 bytes of initialisation
vector (IV), followed by the AES-128-GCM encrypted data and
its 12 byte authentication tag. In this way we ensure that data
cannot be modified by altering the IV or by tampering with the
ciphertext.
The system is built to handle cookies both in the encrypted
and unencrypted subsection, as the webclient uses secure
cookies that can not be accessed from the javascript appli-
cation, hence making it impossible to encrypt them. Since
cookies store only the access and refresh tokens, that are as-
sociated with an encrypted session, they are useless without
the encryption key, so can be transmitted in clear without any
security trade-off.
Client and server, when decrypting packets will join the head-
ers to re-create the orginal packet, in case of conflicting head-
ers the encrypted ones will prevail. This applies to cookies
too, since they are in practice transmitted as a header. A lim-
Unencrypted
(Headers)
Necessary headers for
transmission and decryption
Encrypted
(Body)
Initialisation Vector (IV)
Headers
Timestamp, nonce,
session, cookies*
Payload
Body of request
or response
Authentication tag
Table 1: Tunnel packet structure
itation of this method is the unability to send both, encrypted
and unencrypted cookies, for instance the aforementioned
case of the secure cookies.
3 Implementation
3.1 Backend implementation
This project is composed of several parts, an API controller, a
Session model, and a middleware. The controller provides a
three RESTful routes:
• GET /tunnel/key to request the signed public parameter
Q, a point on the curve25519, to perform the ECDHE;
• POST /tunnel/key to submit the ECDHE exchange and
issue a new tunnel session, identified by an UID;
• PUT /tunnel/key to submit an ECDHE exchange to re-
fresh the tunnel when it is expired.
This API relies on the Session model to store the derived en-
cryption key and expiration, identified by the unique identifier
UID. When a client connects through the tunnel an encrypted
session is created, that cannot in any case be converted to
an unencrypted one. A session is uniquely tied with an oauth
AccessToken and RefreshToken through the UID, this means
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Tunnel
Landing
Login
Exchanges
E
C
D
H
E
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R
P
E
C
D
H
E
E
C
D
H
E
Key refresh timeout
Time
Figure 5: Schematic tunnel structure
Headers
Payload
Encryption
Tunnel
Unencrypted
headers
Encrypted
headers
Payload
Decryption
Headers
Payload
Figure 6: Schematic tunnel packet transmission
that if the encryption key is lost then the user must login again
and a new session must be established.
Once an encrypt session is established all requests to the API
will be routed through POST /tunnel/data, to be then han-
dled by a middleware, schematically represented in figure 7.
It is executed as an outer shell of the application: it intercepts
the requests, decrypts and verifies the validity of the packet,
and if any of the parameters is wrong it will return an error
to the client. If the server is able to decrypt the request the
response or error is encrypted, otherwise it is unencrypted.
After verifying the previosly discussed security features, such
as nonce and timestamp, the middleware creates a new re-
quest with the unencrypted route, parameters and payload,
ready to be submitted to the router. This component is run
as an early middleware, allowing it to intercept the request al-
most before any parsing is done. The API, being written in
PHP, relies on some pre-processing that unfortunately is not
available within the encrypted tunnel and is to be done man-
ually, specifically the superglobals: $ GET, $ POST, $ COOKIES,
$ SERVER, and $ FILES.
Encrypted headers, once decoded, are added to the new re-
quest merging them with the $ SERVER superglobal. Since
cookies are also a header, they are specifically parsed by a
class according to RFC 6265 [4], subsection 5.4.
The API mostly handles JSON encoded requests, with
some exceptions, such as attachment submission or file
upload. The discriminant factor is the Content-Type
header, when it is either multipart/form-data or
application/x-www-form-urlencoded the request is
additionally parsed by a class built upon RFC 2388 [1]. Many
edge cases and the necessity to parse data coming form a
moltitude of different clients and browsers made this task
particularly intricated.
3.2 Frontend implementation
3.2.1 Client threats
The tunnel has been designed to address the threat model,
given that the front end code is not flawed. On application
clients, like the Android or iOS app, as well as the bridge and
the VPN apps this is easily addressable, while for the web-
client extra safety measures must be implemented, to verify
the JS app integrity. This project is being developed parallel
to a code integrity verification system, that will provide trust
on the application layer.
Key Verification To verify the signature on the public pa-
rameter Q of the ECDHE exchange a public signing key is
available in ProtonMail’s key verification system. This technol-
ogy is based upon COINKS [12], an end-user key verification
service capable of integration in end-to-end encrypted com-
munication systems. The clients will have to first retrieve the
key from the public key API, then verify it against the Merkle
tree as described in the paper, to then verify the signature.
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Figure 7: Schematic middleware representation
3.2.2 Migration
Clients must be allowed to communicate in both the encrypted
and unencrypted form; since it will require time to implement
this feature the tunnel will not be enforced on all connections.
If at the beginning of a session an ECDHE key is negiotiated
between the two parties then the connection will be stored as
encrypted and it will not be possible to communicate without
encryption using that specific identifier, as it could be used as
a downgrade attack.
Sessions are in fact divided in encrypted and unencrypted
and it won’t be allowed to switch between the two states.
Disabling encryption on a session can be overridden by the
server, for instance when testing, since the developer tools in
any browser will just show unintelligible blobs of data being
sent to POST /tunnel/data, and using any API development
tool will turn out to be overly complicated.
3.3 Testing
To test the API implementation several approaches have been
followed: unit tests for the single modules, functional tests for
the API and middleware, end-to-end tests for a bigger-picture
testing, and a proxy for manual testing.
Unit and functional tests have been developed to work on
Continuous Integration (CI), and be automatically performed,
while end-to-end must be run with a fully functioning HTTP
server to test the middleware’s interaction with the requests.
All of these tests are designed to test several API function-
alities, such as key exchanges and renegotiation, and the
middleware functionalities, from the basic encryption and de-
cryption to the edge cases of encrypted cookies and multipart
requests.
3.3.1 Test proxy
To perform manual testing of the tunnel a NodeJS proxy has
been developed, nicknamed NodeProxy, that provides a com-
patibility interface between the existing clients and the API
with the tunnel enabled.
To mediate this interface the test proxy:
1. performs the key exchange using the OpenPG-
PJS library, directly accessing the newly-inserted
genPublicEphemeralKey function;
2. initiates a session and displays the current session UID
and encryption key, taking care of encryption and decryp-
tion of all traffic;
3. on login intercepts the SRP params and performs a
MITM attack and updates the encryption key;
4. when key refresh is necessary it locks and queues all the
requests in an await status, to perform a new handshake.
This proxy is completely transparent to the clients, it is needed
just to alter the API address to match the proxy’s.
In order to perform SRP transparently this tool is requires the
user’s password and features a full implementation of an inline
MITM attack. The proxy:
1. detects a log-in attempt by listening to the API calls, when
a call to POST /auth/info a verifier and a challenge are
generated, emulating an SRP server;
2. forwards the signed modulus in the server’s response,
and alters the ephemeral challenge;
3. detects a call to POST /auth and generates a client
ephemeral and proof;
4. responds to the client with a newly-generated server
proof and confirms the login.
This attack, illustrated in figure 8, is possible only by knowing
the user’s password, and required writing a JS implementa-
tion of an SRP server, previously not available.
4 Conclusions
The aim of this project is to guarantee the security and au-
thenticity of all the information shared between the client and
the server by encrypting every request to the server, before
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transmitting it over TLS. This is achieved by studying and ad-
dressing TLS’s main weaknesses, thus significantly raising
the complexity of an attack.
In most cases TLS is being systematically intercepted by
proxies, that would be prevented to access and alter the trans-
mitted information, thus only being capable to block the user
from connecting ProtonMail’s services without being able to
tamper with the data. Malicious TLS compromise is very
alarming because it is a critical issue with a very little foot-
print, as it is usually a relatively elaborate attack, that requires
a targeted intent. In this case cracking the second layer of
encryption renders the attack much more difficult, either by
altering the client code or by cracking another set of encryp-
tion keys.
The tunnel secures the packets by encrypting them with a
symmetric cipher, keeping public only the session identifiers
necessary to fetch the correct decryption key. In order to me-
diate a session key, two different key exchanges are used: the
first using elliptic curves immediately on landing, the second
taking advantage of the residual secret from the password ex-
change protocol. Login is therefore a critical security step for
the tunnel: assuming an attacker does neither know the pass-
word verifier, nor the password itself, the SRP exchange is
immune to MITM attacks. In fact, the tunnel not only protects
the transmitted data, but ensures full authenticity of the con-
nection, guaranteeing that every non-compromised client im-
plementation is communicating exclusively with ProtonMail’s
authorized servers.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that TLS is broken, and
this implementation does not supply a replacement to it. The
tunnel can indeed be used to transfer data over an insecure
channel, but it is designed to co-operate with TLS and rem-
edy to the most critical aspects of it. Moreover, this project
is not meant to be an implementation standard as it does not
fit most use modes of TLS. In fact, the project derives from a
further need of data protection for high-confidentiality applica-
tions and is tailored onto ProtonMail’s specific case.
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Client Proxy Server
username username
Generates ss
Fetches vs, salts
k = Hash(M, g)
Ss = g
ss + kvs
Ss, salts, M
Generates cp
k = Hash(M, g)
xs = Hash(p, salts)
Cp = g
cp
us = Hash(Ss, Cp)
gss = Ss − kgxs
Kps = (g
ss)cp+usxs
PCp = Hash(Ss, Cp,Kps)
Generates sp, saltp
vp = g
Hash(p,saltp)
Sp = g
sp + kvp
Sp, saltp, M
Generates cc
k = Hash(M, g)
xc = Hash(p, saltp)
Cc = g
cc
uc = Hash(Sp, Cc)
gsp = Sp − kgxc
Kcp = (g
sp)cc+ucxc
PCc = Hash(Sp, Cc,Kcp)
Cc, PCc
uc = Hash(Sp, Cc)
Kpc = (Ccv
uc
p )
sp
PCc
?
= Hash(Sp, Cc,Kpc)
PSp = Hash(Sp, PCc,Kpc)
Fetches Cp, PCp
Cp, PC
us = Hash(Ss, Cp)
Ksp = (Cpv
u
s )
ss
PCp
?
= Hash(Ss, Cp,Ksp)
PSs = Hash(Ss, PCp,Ksp)
PSs
PSs
?
= Hash(Ss, PCp,Kps)
Fetches PSp
PSp
PSp
?
= Hash(Sp, PCc,Kcp)
Kcp = Kpc = g
(cc+ucxc)sp Ksp = Kps = g
(cp+usxs)ss
Figure 8: SRP MITM attack, inline, as implemented in NodeProxy. M is the fixed Modulus, g the generator, p is the user’s
password, vs is the server’s password verifier.
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